Online Ad Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Online Ad Auctions: An Experiment
A human subject laboratory experiment compares the real-time market performance of the two most popular auction formats for online ad space, Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) and Generalized Second Price (GSP). Theoretical predictions made in papers by Varian (2007) and Edelman, et al. (2007) seem to organize the data well overall. Efficiency under VCG exceeds that under GSP in nearly all treatments. ...
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We study the online ad-auctions problem introduced by Mehta et. al. [15]. We design a (1 − 1/e)-competitive (optimal) algorithm for the problem, which is based on a clean primal-dual approach, matching the competitive factor obtained in [15]. Our basic algorithm along with its analysis are very simple. Our results are based on a unified approach developed earlier for the design of online algori...
متن کاملOnline Auctions
The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing, because the enormous amount of freely available field data and the emergence of numerous innovative auction design features on auction platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical and experimental research on bidding strategies (including the timing of bi...
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We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In co...
متن کاملCoopetitive Ad Auctions
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual benefit and a benefit-aware Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, perform poorly. In contrast, we show that an appropriate first-price auction has nice equ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.2.430