Online Auctions in IaaS Clouds: Welfare and Profit Maximization With Server Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions
After six long weeks of studying single-parameter auctions to death!, we are ready to move on to the study of multi-parameter auctions. In single-parameter auctions, there was sometimes a single good, and sometimes more than one good (e.g., sponsored search), but the bidders were always characterized by but one parameter. Auctions in which there are multiple (indivisible) goods, and the bidders...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1063-6692,1558-2566
DOI: 10.1109/tnet.2016.2619743