Online Fair Division: A Survey
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Online Fair Division
Hunger is a major problem even in developed countries like Australia. We are working with a social startup, Foodbank Local, and local charities at distributing donated food more efficiently. This food must first be allocated to these charities and then delivered to the end customers. This fair division problem is interesting as it combines traditional features with a number of dimensions that a...
متن کاملOnline Fair Division Redux
Hunger is a major problem worldwide. Food banks around the globe combine forces with various welfare agencies towards alleviating the hunger by assisting people in need. For example, Foodbank Australia cooperates with local charities in order to effectively allocate food as it is donated. In 2014, nearly 10% of these relief organizations could not meet the demand and thus left around 24,000 chi...
متن کاملMost Competitive Mechanisms in Online Fair Division
This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions) in the context of a simple online fair division model where items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via some mechanism. We consider four such online mechanisms: the popular Rankingmat...
متن کاملPure Nash Equilibria in Online Fair Division
We consider a fair division setting in which items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via two existing mechanisms: LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. The LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof whereas the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not. Whilst LIKE is strategy-proof, we show that it is not group strategy-proof. Indeed, our first main result is that no online mechanism is group strategyproof. We then ...
متن کاملOnline Fair Division: Analysing a Food Bank Problem
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse axiomatic properties of these mechanisms such as strategy-proofness and envy freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analysis and compute the price of anarchy.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2374-3468,2159-5399
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i09.7081