Optimal access regulation with downstream competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bottleneck Access with Structural Regulation and Endogenous Competition
In a simple model of network industry, where an upstream monopolist provides an essential input for downstream service supply, we analyze the competitive settings arising in the downstream market under alternative regulatory frameworks; we combine structural (i.e. vertical integration, functional/ownership separation) and conduct (discriminatory and nondiscriminatory access) regulatory remedies...
متن کاملMultilateral Bargaining and Downstream Competition
We examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships which involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers to end consumers. In these relationships the negotiations are inter-dependent and a bargaining externality may arise across the retailers. In addition, the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important. The manufa...
متن کاملDownstream Competition, Bargaining and Welfare
I analyse the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competiti...
متن کاملPlatform Competition and Access Regulation on the Internet
We provide a new model of platform competition on the Internet to analyze the effect of Net Neutrality regulation on market outcomes. Consumers subscribe to two vertically related platforms, an Internet service provider (ISP) and a content network platform (CNP), to reach content providers (CPs). CPs interact with consumers via CNPs. Local ISPs provide an essential input: the Internet connectio...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions with Outside Competition
This paper studies how a revenue-maximizing auction seller responds to competition outside the auction. Outside competition is modeled by buyer-sided outside options. Since outside options for buyers increase the degree of competition from the seller’s point of view, intuition suggests that a revenue-maximizing seller might seek to enhance the competitiveness of her auction offer. In contrast, ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Regulatory Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0922-680X,1573-0468
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9231-x