Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
A principal (dean) has an object (job slot) to allocate to one of I agents (departments). Each agent has a strictly positive value for receiving the object. Each agent also has private information which determines the value to the principal of giving the object to him. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can check the value associated with any individual at a cost which may vary a...
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Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an allocation g(x) that satisfies (IC) and (F). We construct a monotonic g̃(x) that preserves constraints (IC) and (F), but increases the principal’s payoff. We have assumed that F has almost everywhere positive density, so F−1 exists. Define S(t) = ∣∣{y : g(F−1(y)) ≤ t}∣∣, t ∈ R+. Note that S is weakly increasing and satisfies S(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Define g̃(x) = S−...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3779