Optimal Auctions with General Distribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Auctions with General Distributions
This note characterizes revenue maximizing auctions in a single unit independent private value environment when buyers’ distributions of valuations can be discrete, continuous, or any mixture of the two possibilities. The procedure described is applicable to many other singleor multi-agent mechanism design problems with transferable utility and single-dimensional types.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1120865