Optimal collusion-proof auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal collusion-proof auctions
We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction — i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free ...
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We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by a third-party that can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal response of the seller to different threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that, contrary to the prevailing view that asymmetric information imposes transaction costs in side-contracting, collusion in the optimal ...
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We study the problem of collusion in private value auctions by cartels whose members cannot exchange monetary transfers among themselves (i.e. weak cartels). We restrict attention to a large class of auctions that includes standard auctions, which we call winner-payable auctions. Restricting attention to winner payable auctions, we provide a complete characterization of collusion-proof auction ...
متن کاملAppendix to Weak Cartels and Collusion - Proof Auctions
Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions Yeon-Koo Che, Daniele Condorelli, and Jinwoo Kim Proof of Lemma 3: Let us denote by IT , the inequality (20) with S = T ⊂ N . We first show that any p satisfying (21) is an extreme point of P . Note that the allocation probability p can be achieved in a feasible way by assigning the k-th order to each agent π(k) and then allocating the object in this or...
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A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents’ collusion can be prevented at no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents — virtually all circumstances with uncorrelated types and a broad set of circumstances with correlated types. In those circumstances, an optimal outcome in the absence of collusion can be made collusion proof, in a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004