Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly

Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly: An Experiment by

We conduct an experiment to compare equilibrium and alternative solution concepts in a model of oligopoly pricing. We observe considerable heterogeneity across duopoly markets: some duopolies manage to sustain collusive prices, while others compete even more vigorously than equilibrium theory predicts. There is much less variability across four-seller markets. In these the level and dispersion ...

Demand Side Energy Management via Multiagent Coordination in Consumer Cooperatives

A key challenge in creating a sustainable and energy-efficient society is to make consumer demand adaptive to the supply of energy, especially to the renewable supply. In this article, we propose a partially-centralized organization of consumers (or agents), namely, a consumer cooperative that purchases electricity from the market. In the cooperative, a central coordinator buys the electricity ...

CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

Multiagent Coordination for Energy Consumption Scheduling in Consumer Cooperatives

A key challenge to create a sustainable and energyefficient society is in making consumer demand adaptive to energy supply, especially renewable supply. In this paper, we propose a partially-centralized organization of consumers, namely, a consumer cooperative for purchasing electricity from the market. We propose a novel multiagent coordination algorithm to shape the energy consumption of the ...

Oligopoly and financial structure revisited

In this paper we employ a two stage Cournot duopoly model where firms can obtain outside funds only to finance production plans; payouts to shareholders are not allowed. Debt, equity and capacity are chosen in the first stage and output is chosen in the second stage. In contrast to the existing literature in this area, we show firms always choose zero debt in equilibrium. The two important impl...