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متن کاملAppendix for “ Optimal Contracts for Experimentation ”
SA.1. Proof of Proposition 1 We prove the result more generally for contracts with lockouts. Fix a contract C = ( ,W0, b, l). The result is trivial if = ;, so assume 6= ;. Let T = max . For any period t 2 with t < T , define the smallest successor period in as (t) = min{t0 : t0 > t, t0 2 }; moreover, let (0) = min . Given any action profile for the agent, the agent’s time-zero expected discount...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.11.003