Optimal dynamic information provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal dynamic information provision
We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends...
متن کاملDynamic Bayesian Information Measures
This paper introduces measures of information for Bayesian analysis when the support of data distribution is truncated progressively. The focus is on the lifetime distributions where the support is truncated at the current age t>=0. Notions of uncertainty and information are presented and operationalized by Shannon entropy, Kullback-Leibler information, and mutual information. Dynamic updatings...
متن کاملCompeting Through Information Provision∗
This paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two-buyer, two-seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision. More informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade. I establish how the characteristics of exogenously fixed sale mechanisms determine equilibrium information provision and show that competition gene...
متن کاملReflecting on Dynamic Service Provision
Delivering multimedia services to roaming subscribers raises significant challenges for content providers. There are a number of reasons for this; however, the principal difficulties arise from the inherent differences between the nature of mobile computing usage, and that of its static counterpart. The harnessing of appropriate contextual elements pertaining to a mobile subscriber at any given...
متن کاملInformation Provision and Price Competition
Two sellers with ex-ante identical products, whose qualities can be either high or low, first choose a binary information structure, modeled as the probability that the signal reveals the state. After the buyer independently draws one private signal from each information structure, the sellers then each choose a price in the second stage. We identify two equilibria in information structures, a ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.010