Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design With Stochastic Supply and Flexible Consumers
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this article, we consider the problem of designing an expected-revenue-maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple nonperishable goods $k$ varieties to flexible consumers over notation="LaTeX">$T$ time steps. our model, a random number each variety may become available seller at time, and enter market time. Each consumer is present in one step wants consume good its desired varieties. associated with flexibility level that indicates it equally interested in. A consumer’s utility gets from consuming are private information. We characterize allocation rule Bayesian-incentive-compatible, individually rational, terms solution dynamic program. The corresponding payment function also specified optimal function. leverage structure consumers’ model simplify Our simplified program allows us provide explicit procedure simple
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0018-9286', '1558-2523', '2334-3303']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2022.3184394