Optimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure Under Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty∗
Since the introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Bebchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988) to identify the optimal procedure to resolve cases in a context of uncertainty related to the law (L-un...
متن کاملOptimal Corporate Activities under Uncertainty and Competition
An outline of objectives Commercial enterprises are considered moving for maximizing their expected payoff. Traditional Net Present Value (NPV) method is one of the measures of investment decision. But static NPV method has its limits, since there is a lot of uncertainty in business situations so that actual profit includes a lot of risk. Intuitively, one can see that more alternatives that can...
متن کاملOptimal fines for environmental noncompliance under a decentralized enforcement policy
We consider the determination of the optimal ne for noncompliance by a legislator who anticipates the inspection game between an autonomous inspection agency and polluting rms. This agency can make the inspection of individual rms contingent on ambient pollution. The agency's autonomy implies that it cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities. If the legislator centralizes the d...
متن کاملBertrand Competition Under Uncertainty
Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This activity level can be endogenized in any of several ways{ as whether to incur a xed cost of activity, as output choice, or as quality choice. Our model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the s...
متن کاملCournot Competition under Uncertainty∗
We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertaint...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2509729