Optimal Joint Liability Lending and With Costly Peer Monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2533401