Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• 1 item and N bidders • private valuations: vi ∈ {ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,mǫ} • private budgets: bi st b1 < b2 < · · · < bk • private types: t = (v, b) • type distribution: t ∼ π density function: fb(v) distribution function: Fb(v) • monotone hazard rate: (v, b) ≥ (v, b) → 1−Fb(v) fb(v) ≥ 1−Fb′ (v ) f b′ (v ′) • direct mechanism: M = (a, p) allocation probability a(t) (expected) payment p(t) Assumptions...
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A seller who wishes to sell a set of (distinct or similar) items can attempt to do it by a variety of auction mechanisms, such as combinatorial auctions, sequential auctions or parallel auctions. We provide a proof for the intuitive result that if the potential buyers are risk averse, then for every mechanism, the expected revenue of the seller in equilibrium is bounded above by the expected ma...
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1 We are grateful to Steve Matthews for suggesting the approach taken in this study, and to Eric Maskin for his encouraging comment. Abstract This paper concerns the e¢ cient sale of an indivisible risky asset and the e¤ects of changing risk in a setting where buyers exhibit heterogeneous risk preferences. The model allows asymmetric and interdependent values and types. Under certain conditions...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1121123