Optimal pricing and advertising decisions with suppliers' oligopoly competition: Stakelberg-Nash game structures

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper addresses the coordination of pricing, advertising, and production-inventory decisions in a multi-product three-echelon supply chain composed multiple suppliers, single manufacturer, retailers. The demand each product is considered to be non-linearly influenced by retail price advertising expenditure. Taking into account dominant power manufacturer suppliers' oligopoly competition, this aims at obtaining equilibrium prices level comparing two different scenarios competitions cooperation: former focuses on situation where has acts as leader followed retailers suppliers simultaneously. latter implies which enters cooperation with independent retailer boost sales while play role followers We develop Stackelberg-Nash game (SNG), (SNGC) formulations model market structures. are achieved through optimization methods existence uniqueness properties explored. Finally, analytical computational analyses carried out numerical example, comprehensive sensitivity analysis conducted discuss some managerial insights such increasing competition among leads reducing prices.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1547-5816', '1553-166X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2020028