Optimal Pricing in a Rented 5G Infrastructure Scenario with Sticky Customers
نویسندگان
چکیده
The ongoing deployment of 5G is accompanied by architecture and pricing decisions. Network sharing a critical feature, allowing operators to reduce their costs, but introducing mixed partnering/competition situation, where the infrastructure owner, renting out virtual (who act as customers), also provides services end customers, competing with operators. Pricing leverage through which an optimal balance between two roles accomplished. However, may not be only variable affecting customers’ choice, prefer (stick to) one operator for several reasons. In this paper, we formulate game model analyse decisions in presence such sticky behaviour customers. After concluding that does allow Nash equilibrium, consider case when parties (the operators, or regulator) responsible setting prices how operators’ profits are impacted price-setting powers shifted among parties. scenario regulator sets leads lowest even lower than competitors set prices.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Future Internet
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1999-5903']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15020082