Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives in Duopoly with Product Differentiation
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0931-8658
DOI: 10.1007/bf01232420