Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting
We analyze a di¤erential game describing the interactions between a rm that might be violating competition law and the antitrust authority. The objective of the authority is to minimize social costs (loss in consumer surplus) induced by an increase in prices above marginal costs. It turns out that the penalty schemes which are used now in EU and US legislation appear not to be as e¢ cient as d...
متن کاملSubpart 3.3—Reports of Suspected Antitrust Violations
(1) Offered or gave a gratuity (e.g., an entertainment or gift) to an officer, official, or employee of the Government; and (2) Intended by the gratuity to obtain a contract or favorable treatment under a contract (intent generally must be inferred). (b) Agency procedures shall afford the contractor an opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documentary evidence, present witnesses, and confr...
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In this article we incorporate notions of the fairness of sanctions into the standard model of public enforcement. When both the probability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the usual solution involves a very high sanction and a relatively low probability of enforcement if individuals are risk neutral. When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, the optimal sanction generally ...
متن کاملBrand-name drug manufacturers risk antitrust violations by slowing generic production through patent layering.
Patents on many blockbuster drugs will expire in the near future, opening up the doorways for generic production. Brandname drug companies lose an estimated half of their U.S. sales during the first six months of generic production alone. In an effort to forestall large sales declines, some brand-name pharmaceutical companies are scrambling to delay generic production. One measure brand-name ph...
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The dynamic behavior of a price-fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. The intertemporal structure of the price path is characterized and the effect of antitrust policy on the cartel’s steady-state price is explored. ∗I want to thank Bates, White and Ballantine for re-stimulating my interest in this topic. I’d also like to acknowledge ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The University of Chicago Law Review
سال: 1983
ISSN: 0041-9494
DOI: 10.2307/1599506