Optimal share contracts between pig producers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information
In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Agricultural and Food Science
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1795-1895,1459-6067
DOI: 10.2137/145960607783328191