Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Risk Sharing With Limited Liability∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00024.x