Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We investigate the design of an optimal Unemployment Insurance program using an equilibrium search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources. We examine (a) the optimal potential duration of UI benefits, (b) the optimal UI replacement rate when the potential duration of benefits is optimal, and (c) the optimal UI replacement rate when...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance
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In the recent literature the introduction of modified cost functions has added reality into the classical oligopoly analysis. Furthermore, the market evolution requires much more flexibility to firms, and in several countries contingent workforce plays an important role in the production choices by the firms. Therefore, an analysis of dynamic adjustment costs is in order to understand oligopoly...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program imp...
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In the framework of a search and matching model, when search effort enters the labor market matching function, search effort by one worker generates a negative externality on other workers searching for jobs. The solution to the social planner’s problem may not be decentralized in a competitive market. Calibration shows that the current US unemployment insurance (UI) system generates an 8.07% w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.05.015