Optimal tax policy under heterogeneous environmental preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences
Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best result...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.032