Optimal Trading for an Informed Seller
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auction Selection by an Informed Seller
We analyze selection of an auction format by an informed seller. We model a game with two stages: first, an informed seller announces a good for sale and chooses an auction format from a set of standard auctions; second, privately informed bidders compete for the object. The game has an important signaling element as the auction choice may signal the seller’s type. We study both private and com...
متن کاملOn the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure
We consider a revenue maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyers’ valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The seller therefore has information about buyers’ valuations that is not common knowledge. How will the seller di...
متن کاملOptimal Informed Trading in a Quote-Driven Market
This paper presents a model of a quote-driven market with asymmetric information. The model is similar to the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model, except that we allow the informed trader to optimally time his trades, rather than employing a probabilistic selection process for informed and uninformed trades. The contribution of the paper is to show that the probabilistic arrival process is a robust as...
متن کاملAuction and the informed seller problem
A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction with announced reserve price. The choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers. We compare the outcome of a game where the seller runs himself the auction (signaling) and a game where a monopoly broker chooses the trade mechanism (screening). For the former cas...
متن کاملInformed seller in a Hotelling market
We consider the problem of a monopolist seller who is selling a good to a potential buyer and is privately informed about some of the goods attributes. We focus on the case where goods with di¤erent attributes are horizontally di¤erentiated: they appeal di¤erently to di¤erent types of the buyer. Such a market is represented via a standard Hotelling (1929) model, where the sellers and the buye...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3388859