OPTIMAL TWO-PART TARIFF LICENSING CONTRACTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS AND ENDOGENOUS R&D*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Three-Part Tariff Plans
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Manchester School
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1463-6786
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02311.x