Optimal unemployment insurance: Consumption versus expenditure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We investigate the design of an optimal Unemployment Insurance program using an equilibrium search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources. We examine (a) the optimal potential duration of UI benefits, (b) the optimal UI replacement rate when the potential duration of benefits is optimal, and (c) the optimal UI replacement rate when...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance
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متن کاملUnemployment insurance benefit levels and consumption changes
We use a Canadian survey of the unemployed to examine how household expenditures after a job loss respond to the level of income replacement provided by UI. We isolate a liquidity constraint or ‘transitory income’ effect from the ‘permanent income’ shock of job loss, and from the costs of working. We find significant effects of varying the replacement ratio among the third of the sample who did...
متن کاملOptimal Public Expenditure with Inefficient Unemployment
This paper proposes a theory of optimal public expenditure when unemployment is inefficient. The theory is based on a matching model. Optimal public expenditure deviates from the Samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap (the gap between the current and efficient rates of unemployment). Such optimal “stimulus spending” is described by a formula expressed with estimable sufficient statistics...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program imp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Labour Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0927-5371
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.11.004