Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both treatments, but is more prevalent in the treatment where the costs of overbidding are lower. We spe...
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We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) rst-price auction model with resale and a model of rst-price common-value auctions. The common value is de ned by the transaction price when trade takes place. When there is no trade, the common value is de ned through a monotonic extension of the resale price function. We show bid equivalence when (1) there are two b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9510-y