Optimizing positional scoring rules for rank aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimizing Positional Scoring Rules for Rank Aggregation
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is asked to rank a fixed (small) number of alternatives and, then, a positional scoring rule is used to compute the aggregate ranking. Among the apparently infin...
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Positional scoring rules in voting compute the score of an alternative by summing the scores for the alternative induced by every vote. This summation principle ensures that all votes contribute equally to the score of an alternative. We relax this assumption and, instead, aggregate scores by taking into account the rank of a score in the ordered list of scores obtained from the votes. This def...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.11.001