Outcome-based contracts as new business model: The role of partnership and value-driven relational assets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Value, Variety and Viability: New Business Models for Co-Creation in Outcome-based Contracts
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3349 Firms routinely rely on the goodwill of their trading partners. In developed economies, ongoing relationships complement formal contracts in mitigating holdup and facilitating transactions (Stewart Macaulay 1963). In developing economies, where contracts enjoy little legal protection, long-term relationships are even more critical for trade (John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff 1999). Th...
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This paper studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. I show that if the principal has the bargaining power, she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Industrial Marketing Management
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0019-8501
DOI: 10.1016/j.indmarman.2013.05.009