Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper develops a Nash bargaining model of price formation in the art market. Agents can be naïve, if they are overconfident and either overestimate artistic quality or underestimate their uncertainty quality, sophisticated, correctly use all available information. Overconfidence turns out to have positive impact on both average artworks traded The overconfidence expected is weaker than corresponding increase, so sellers overcharge buyers. In addition, buyer’s (seller’s) has (negative) likelihood trade. If many pairs agents may bargain simultaneously, we find that seller’s market power negatively affected by number positively sophisticated naïve buyers coexist, exert negative externality ones, increasing latter pay.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economia Politica
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1973-820X', '1120-2890']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40888-022-00273-9