Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pre - electoral Coalitions and Post - election Bargaining ∗
We study a game-theoretic model where three political parties (left, median and right) can form coalitions both before and after the election. Before the election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy platform or a division of rents from office; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coal...
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In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scena...
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Abstract. This paper considers an alternating offer legislative bargaining game with heterogeneous ideological preferences modeled as ideal points on an interval. The main contribution is a framework for measuring two forces that typically give proposers incentive to form coalitions out of either the left or right halves of the ideological spectrum “polar coalitions”. For a benchmark model with...
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We first observe that two of Maskin’s results do not extend beyond three players: we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique efficient solution for each ordering of the players, but for which the payoff vector obtained by averaging these solutions over the d...
متن کاملEnlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions
In this paper we introduce a new concept of solution for games with fuzzy coalitions, which we call an enlarged core. The enlarged core captures an idea that various groups of fuzzy coalitions can have different bargaining power or influence on the final distribution of wealth resulting from the cooperation process.We study a bargaining scheme for the enlarged core, which is an iterative proced...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1690472