Overseas voters

Persuading Voters ∗

We consider a symmetric information voting model where a group of uninformed voters must collectively choose a policy. An individual (information controller) can influence voters’ choices by designing the information content of a public signal. We characterize the controller’s optimal signal, and how it varies with the electoral rules and the distribution of voters’ preferences. We show that un...

Voters ⇤ RICARDO

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (information controller) can influence voters’ choices by designing the information content of a public signal. We characterize the controller’s optimal signal. With a non-unanimous voting rule, she exploits voters’ heterogeneity by designing a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning-coalitions. Consequently, under simple-majori...

Testing overseas doctors.

Do Voters Vote Sincerely?∗

In this paper we address the following questions: (i) To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? And (ii) in environments where the hypothesis is falsifiable, to what extent is the observed behavior of voters consistent with sincere voting? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincere...

Rich and Poor Voters

mericans are worried about polarization, but we can’t always agree on what exactly we’re polarized about. You might say that we’re polarized about polarization. On the left are concerns about economic polarization, the widening divide between the haves and the have-nots and the increasingly unequal distribution at the high end, with the richest one-tenth of 1 percent of Americans taking 7 perce...