Owner-Intruder contests with information asymmetry

نویسندگان

چکیده

We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals – the Owner and Intruder model situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. The is possession of resource when another individual, Intruder, comes along may try to steal it. If makes such stealing attempt, has decide whether defend resource; if defends, can withdraw or continue with attempt. value differently we distinguish three information cases: (a) both know values them, (b) only their own valuation, (c) do not at all. solve all cases. identify scenarios it beneficial for much possible. also several where knowing less seems better well show that individual benefit from opponent less. Finally, same kind but without option withdraw. find that, surprisingly, typically fares case.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1760-6101', '0973-5348']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1051/mmnp/2021006