Ownership Diversification and Product Market Pricing Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
product diversification (related/unrelated) ,ownership structure and capital structure
the paper studies of the effect the related and unrelated diversification for products and ownership structure on capital structure for a sample of 87 firms out of 19 industry listed on the tehran stock exchange during the period 2004- 2009. for to regress of models to apply of multivariate approach include panel data and cross-sectional regressions. this study adopts panel fixed effects regres...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4282394