Ownership Structure and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Jordan
نویسندگان
چکیده
The current study examines the effect of ownership structure (i.e., government ownership, family and foreign ownership) on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, by considering Jordan as a case study. By using sample 136 non-financial firms listed Amman Stock Exchange over period 2015–2019, we find that has positive significant impact CEO compensation. finding regarding is contrary to expectations, with higher reflecting Overall, these results imply Jordanian companies exerts influence pay setting process. However, no relationship This indicates ineffective determining We further firm size positively related compensation, indicating larger have more ability generate high internal funding, can afford quality managerial talent. In contrast, effects age liquidity are not at levels.
منابع مشابه
Board Compensation and Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of CEO Duality (Evidence from Banking Industry)
The purpose of this paper is to explore relationship between board compensation and risk taking with regard to CEO duality in the banking industry. Using a panel data regression model, with regard to optimal contracting and managerial power theory, we examined the data to determine the relationship between board compensation and risk taking of twenty one banks, for the period 2012 to 2018. R...
متن کاملCEO ownership and rm value: Evidence from a structural estimation
I estimate a dynamic model in which a board of directors and a CEO interact to set the levels of CEO incentives and e¤ort. The intent is to understand the e¤ect that CEO incentives have on rm value. In the model incentive levels are the result of CEO risk aversion, the cost of CEO e¤ort, the e¤ect of CEO e¤ort on rm value, the volatility of shocks to rm value, and the preference a board has ...
متن کاملCEO compensation and incentives: evidence from M&A bonuses
We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own fi...
متن کاملCEO power, ownership structure and pay performance in Chinese banking
This paper examines the determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005–2012. Using the fixed effects panel, 2SLS and dynamic GMM regressions, I find that there is no significant positive pay performance relation, and CEO power does not necessarily exhibit higher levels of executive compensation. However, I show that ownership structure (measured by ownership concentration...
متن کاملOptimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asian Economic and Financial Review
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2222-6737', '2305-2147']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.aefr.2021.115.365.383