Ownership Structure, Voting, and Risk

Ownership structure, Voting and Risk

We analyze the determinants of ownership structure in firms when conflicts of interest on risk arise endogenously via different ownership stakes and firm decisions are made through majority voting. A large block is chosen to incentivize monitoring. Because a large blockholder holds a large share of the firm, he is averse to risky investing. This generates a conflict of interest with dispersed s...

Dual Ownership , Returns , and Voting in Mergers

We document that in M&As a significant proportion of targets’ equity is owned by financial institutions that simultaneously own targets’ bonds (“dual holders”). Targets with larger equity ownership by dual holders have lower M&A equity premia and larger abnormal bond returns, particularly when dual holders stand to benefit more from appreciation of their bond stakes, e.g., when their bond owner...

Decoupling Economic Ownership and Voting Power

Ownership, voting, and job creation in Russia

Job creation has had important economic and political consequences for countries in transition. Evidence from a survey of 500 firms in Russia finds that new private firms are more likely to increase employment, while worker-owned and worker-managed firms are less likely to create jobs. In addition, firm managers who expand employment appear to be a constituency for market-oriented parties. Mana...

Investigating the effect of ownership structure on banks' risk-taking behavior

The ownership structure is one of the important issues of corporate governance that can affect the efficiency of companies by influencing managerial motivations. The aim of the present study is to investigate the asymmetric effect of ownership structure on bankschr('39') risk-taking behavior. The present study was conducted using the information of twenty-one banks listed on the Tehran Security...