Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium
We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics — pairwise comparison dynamics — under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such dynamics satisfy Nash stationarity: the set of rest points of these dynamics is always identical to the set of...
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Article history: Received 29 March 2013 Available online 10 February 2014 JEL classification: C72 D83 D85
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2009
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g1010003