Pareto meets Olson – A Note on Pareto-optimality and Group Size in Linear Public Goods Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price of Pareto Optimality in Hedonic Games
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ORDO
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2366-0481,0048-2129
DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2012-0115