Partial Collusion with Asymmetric Cross-Price Effects
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collusion with asymmetric retailers: Evidence from a gasoline price-fixing case∗
We provide a description of the internal functioning of a price-posting retail market cartel based on an analysis of court documents containing the recorded conversations of participants in actual gasoline cartels operating in Québec. We characterize the organization and the pricing mechanism of the cartels, and we relate our findings to the theoretical literature, proposing a framework for und...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1694941