Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition Policy, Collusion, and Tacit Collusion
In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy t...
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We examine the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. We provide an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and di...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00005.x