Partial Identification in Two-Sided Matching Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Partial Identification in Two-sided Matching Models
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator applies to repeated observations of matchings among a fixed group of individuals, which is a similar data structure as in Fox (2010). Our estimator is based on stability conditions in the matching models; we consider both transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) models. In b...
متن کامل– FORTHCOMING in Advances in Econometrics (vol 31) – PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MODELS
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator applies to repeated observations of matchings among a fixed group of individuals, which is a similar data structure as in Fox (2010). Our estimator is based on stability conditions in the matching models; we consider both transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) models. In b...
متن کامل– FORTHCOMING in Advances in Econometrics ( vol 31 ) – PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION IN TWO - SIDED MATCHING MODELS
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator applies to repeated observations of matchings among a fixed group of individuals, which is a similar data structure as in Fox (2010). Our estimator is based on stability conditions in the matching models; we consider both transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) models. In b...
متن کاملBalanced Two-sided Matching
In two-sided matching problem, there are overwhelming evidences that support peoples are also motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. We will show that compromise which is individually irrational improves the welfare of the whole groups. The reasonable compromise level is obtained as the function of the size of the group so that the social utility should be maximized.
متن کاملTwo-sided matching with indifferences
Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2752578