Partial information disclosure in a contest
نویسندگان
چکیده
Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica Gentzkow (2011) analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate increase expected efforts contest, based upon active participation by all types informed player. We allow some exert no effort showing how this (i) applicability previous results, (ii) cases, change type disclosure.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1873-7374', '0165-1765']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109915