Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Partnership with partial commitment: a game theoretic approach
This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full commitment fuels suspicion and increases potential losses for partners. The Nash-equilibrium commitment of each partner increases with her internal return, quitting cost and costs of being deserted and with her counterpart's external return and intrinsic capacity to detect lack of full commitment, ...
متن کاملPartnership with Partial Commitment
This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full commitment fuels suspicion and increases potential losses for partners. JEL classification: C72, D01, D80 Corresponding Author: Amnon Levy, Economics Discipline, School of Economics and Information Systems, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. Tel: 61-2-42213658 Fax: 61-2-4221...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Mathematical Forum
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1314-7536
DOI: 10.12988/imf.2007.07269