Passive backward acquisitions and downstream collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic downstream collusion with secret vertical contracts
We consider dynamic, infinitely repeated downstream price competition. In every period, a retailer cannot observe the contract that the competing retailer offers to a joint supplier. We find that even though contracts are secret, they enable retailers to collude. The more the retailers and the supplier care about future profits, retailers obtain a higher share of the monopoly profits. We also f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109611