Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collective Rationality and Social Choice
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if a collective choice rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for a collective choice rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective...
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The notions of linear and metric independence are investigated in relation to the property: if U is a set of m + 1 independent vectors, and X is a set of m independent vectors, then adjoining some vector in U to X results in a set of m + 1 independent vectors. A weak countable choice axiom is introduced, in the presence of which linear and metric independence are equivalent. Proofs are carried ...
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We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Unlike the standard economic theory of revealed preference, our method is can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. Paralleling the standard theory we present a model for choice such that the observations arise "as if" they were the result of a speci c decision making process. ...
متن کاملChoice , internal consistency , and rationality
Choice, internal consistency, and rationality* Aditi Bhattacharyya Telephone: (951) 970 3431; E-mail: [email protected] Prasanta K. Pattanaik Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, U.S.A. Telephone: (951) 789 7265; Fax: (951) 789 7265; E-mail: [email protected] Yongsheng Xu Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georg...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1973
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/1914037