Path to Stochastic Stability: Comparative Analysis of Stochastic Learning Dynamics in Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Path to Stochastic Stability: Comparative Analysis of Stochastic Learning Dynamics in Games
Stochastic stability is a popular solution concept for stochastic learning dynamics in games. However, a critical limitation of this solution concept is its inability to distinguish between different learning rules that lead to the same steadystate behavior. We address this limitation for the first time and develop a framework for the comparative analysis of stochastic learning dynamics with di...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0018-9286,1558-2523,2334-3303
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2020.3039485