Paths to marriage stability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stability of marriage with externalities
In many matching problems, it is natural to consider that agents may have preferences not only over the set of potential partners but over the whole matching. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings will depend on what agents believe will happen if they deviate. Sasaki and Toda (1996, J. of Econ. Theory, 70, 93) have examined the existence of stable matchings when th...
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Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (smi), a maximum cardinality matching can be larger than a stable matching. In many large-scale applications of smi, we seek to match as many agents as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in I that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (so is “as stable...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/0166-218x(94)00026-a