Pensions and fertility incentives

Pensions with heterogenous individuals and endogenous fertility ∗

This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but different contributions which may or may not increase with the number of children. Additionally, fertility must be subsidized a...

Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability

In this paper, we study a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and public pensions. By assuming Cobb– Douglas technology and logarithmic preferences, we show that the introduction of a fertility-related component in the pay-as-you-go pension scheme may destabilise the long-term equilibrium and cause endogenous fluctuations when individuals have static exp...

Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility∗

This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment. If investments are publicly observable, pension benefits must be linked positively to the level of investment, and payroll taxes negatively to the number of children. The outcome is characterized by f...

Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on Tax Incentives and Fertility

This paper exploits the introduction of a pro-natalist transfer policy in the Canadian province of Quebec that paid up to C$8,000 to families having a child. I implement a quasi-experimental strategy by forming treatment and control groups defined by time, jurisdiction, and family type. The incentive was available broadly, rather than to a narrow population as studied in previous work, providin...

Public Pensions and Demographic Changes in Developed Countries: Migration Boom and Fertility Bust?