Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9289-1