Perfect implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Perfect implementation
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism —by disregarding the players’ privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator— may fail to reach the mechanism’s objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the noti...
متن کاملPerfect Implementation Accessed Terms of Use Perfect Implementation
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism —by disregarding the players’ privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator— may fail to reach the mechanism’s objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the noti...
متن کاملSubgame Perfect Implementation With Almost Perfect Information
The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information...
متن کاملSubgame Perfect Implementation under Perfect and Almost Perfect Information: An Empirical Test
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good’s value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a s...
متن کاملPerfect Concrete Implementation of Arbitrary Mechanisms
s/yao_abs.html. Naor, M., Pinkas, B. and Sumner, R.: 1999, Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design, Proceedings of the 1st conference on ElectronicCommerce, ACM. Urbano, A. and Vila, J. E.: 2002, Computational complexity and communication: Coordination in two-player games, Econometrica 70(5), 1893–1927. Yao, A.: 1986, Protocol for secure two-party computation,never published. T...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.003