Performance Pay and Applicant Screening
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Applicant Screening and Performance-Related Outcomes
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: British Journal of Industrial Relations
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0007-1080
DOI: 10.1111/bjir.12443